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Should we treat aging as a disease?
The consequences and dangers
of miscategorisation
Richard G. A. Faragher*
School of Pharmacy and Biomolecular Sciences, University of Brighton, Brighton, UK
The aging of the population represents one of the largest healthcare challenges facing
the world today. The available scientific evidence shows that interventions are available
now that can target fundamental “aging” processes or pathways. Sufficient economic
evidence is available to argue convincingly that this approach will also save enormous
sums of money which could then be deployed to solve other urgent global problems.
However, as yet this scenario has barely entered the public consciousness and, far from
being a point of vigorous debate, seems to be ignored by policy makers. Understanding
why this lethargy exists is important given the urgent need to deal with the challenge
represented by population aging. In this paper I hypothesize that one major cause of
inaction is a widely held, but flawed, conceptual framework concerning the relationship
between aging and disease that categorizes the former as “natural” and the latter as
“abnormal.” This perspective is sufficient in itself to act as a disincentive to intervention
by rendering those who hold it prone to the “naturalistic fallacy” but can give rise to active
hostility to biogerontology if coupled with loose and/or blurred understanding of the goals
and potential of the field.
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Introduction
Terminology in a Contested Field
One problemwhen discussing the science of aging is that the sameword oftenmeans different things
to different people. In this article the word “aging” is used specifically to describe the operation of
processes within whole organisms or populations of such organisms that result in an exponential
increase in the chance of both death (mortality) and sickness (morbidity) with the passage of
time (the Gompertz relationship). Again, in this article, “senescence” is restricted to cells from
mitotic populations which have undergone irreversible exit from the cell cycle and display an altered
phenotype. The accumulation of such senescent cells in the somatic tissues of organisms capable of
replacing lost cells is one aging mechanism.
A related problem is a tendency for those discussing the “ethical issues” of aging research to
conflate “immortality” and “living forever” with “extended lifespan” and both with being “non-
aging.” This is unhelpful. Accordingly, the following definitions are used here. An “immortal”
organism is one that will never die through any intrinsic cause. For the purposes of argument I
assume it can still be killed by extrinsic means. It is important to note that no such organisms
are currently known to exist. In contrast “non-aging” organisms do exist in the biosphere
(Arctica islandica and Hydra being famous examples). Such organisms show a (relatively) fixed
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chance of sickness and death year on year in contrast to the
exponential increase seen in species showing aging. Thus, with a
chance of death that is fixed, but low, lifespans of centuries are
achievable in the wild.
“Extended lifespan” is regularly used in the biogerontological
literature with reference to mutations or interventions which
cause individuals from a species which shows aging to live longer.
To date, organisms in which lifespan has been extended have not
been “converted” into non-aging organisms. Rather, the increase
in their rates of mortality have been significantly attenuated,
but not abolished, resulting in longer lifespans. References to
“extended lifespan” tend to discount discussion of health status.
Thus gerontologists prefer the term “healthspan” indicating an
increase in the period of healthy life. Increased healthspan is a
corollary of the interventions that produce extended lifespan but
is not the same thing.
Lastly it should be noted that “lifespan” and “life expectancy”
are not synonymous. Lifespan is the maximum length of
time members of a given species can live. In contrast “life
expectancy” is the likely survival time and is strongly influenced
by environmental conditions. Thus in the 20th Century the life
expectancy of humans increased dramatically (which is why there
aremore old people). In contrast lifespan appears to be unchanged
(a maximum of120 years).
The Scale of the Challenge Posed by Aging
It is possible, but rare, to age in relatively good health. For the
majority of people growing old is associated not just with an
increased risk of death but alsowith a significant risk of developing
a plethora of degenerative conditions and functional impairments
Khaw (1999). This burden of morbidity is probably the most
distressing aspect of old age and it has negative effects on two
levels.
Firstly, morbidity incurs very significant costs on essentially
every component of the health care system (Seshamani and
Gray, 2004; Comas-Herrera et al., 2007; NHS National Statistics,
2008). At the level of the individual citizen, the simple truth
is that growing old is a thoroughly miserable experience for an
unacceptably large proportion of the population (Jylhä, 2004;
Pérès et al., 2008). When rated against the standard benchmarks
a biological gerontologist would use to measure successful aging
(maintenance of normal function, avoidance of disease and
social engagement) only about 18% of people can be described
as undergoing “successful aging” Bowling and Dieppe (2005).
When individuals are asked to self-rate whether they are aging
successfully they draw on both physiological and psychosocial
factors which results in larger apparent success scores. However,
these are only of the order of 50–75% (Strawbridge et al., 2002).
This difference illustrates two important points. The first is that
it is possible to be happy with your lot against a background of
morbidity. However, the second is that anywhere between half and
a quarter of elderly people do not consider themselves to be aging
well. They are not happy and are probably not healthy either.
Unless improvements occur, we may end up with a world in
whichwe spendmoremoney than ever before to keepmore people
than ever before more miserable than ever before. Improvement
could come from two quarters. The first of these is the possibility
that better primary prevention may postpone the age of onset of
morbidity. If this occurs to a greater extent than life expectancy
increases then the result would be a reduction in cumulative
lifetime morbidity. This is a concept known as “compression of
morbidity” first formally articulated by Fries (1980) who envisions
it occurring by reducing the lifestyle risks to health which result
in morbidity and disability. There is some evidence that this
is occurring, at least in a limited form (Hessler et al., 2003;
Crimmins, 2004; Fries, 2005).
The second option to improve population aging is to focus
our efforts on understanding how the mechanisms driving aging
operate. There is now evidence in model systems that individual
aging mechanisms play a causal role in multiple morbidities
(see below). Thus, it is plausible that interventions which
simultaneously postpone multiple causes of morbidity could be
developed and translated into practice. This focus on fundamental
agingmechanisms, rather than on “age-related disease” represents
a paradigm shift relative to previous ideas on the relationship
between aging and disease.
The Conceptual Relationship between Aging and
Disease: Then and Now
Recognition that growing old is associated with ill health and
death is at least as old as humanity. However, ideas from the world
of classical antiquity are a good starting point for any discussion
of how the relationship between physical decline and aging was
historically conceptualized by physicians.
In this regard the Greco-Roman world is a better starting
point than, for example, Han China because classical doctors
exercised a marked influence over Western (and subsequently
global) medical thinking until at least the 17th century (Porter,
1999). The contribution of these early ideas to both clinical and
societal conceptions of aging is thus so profound that they are
worth examining at some length.
As Cockayne (2003) has shown, classical thinkers varied in
their view of aging. The authors of the Hippocratic corpus (5th
century BC) essentially regarded aging as a disease. This view was
shared by Seneca (First century AD) and in a nuanced form by
Aristotle (4th century BC) who saw aging as a “natural disease”-
an interesting example of intellectual fence sitting. However, it
was the greatest classical writer on medical matters, Claudius
Galen (c130–c210 AD), who appears to have been the first to have
explicitly considered aging as a “natural condition” standing in
opposition to disease which he considered “contrary to nature.” A
simple summary of this idea might thus be:
(1) Disease is defined as disordered or abnormal function.
(2) Aging is universal. Everyone “catches it.”
(3) That which is universal cannot be abnormal.
(4) Therefore, aging is not a disease. It is a “natural process.”
Galen’s view of a distinction between aging and disease was
transmitted through the classical corpus and thus into modern
societal conceptions of growing old. His ideas were directly
echoed by highly influential modern medical thinkers including
Aldred Warthin (1866–1931) “the father of cancer genetics”
and Ludwig Aschoff (1862–1942) “the Nestor of arteriosclerosis
research” (Achenbaum, 1995).
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Within gerontology, Vladimir Korenchevsky (1880–1959) was
perhaps the most notable proponent of this “Galenic” view. His
early experiences as a clinician in Moscow convinced him that
the disabilities he saw in the elderly were the result of disease
rather than aging itself. According to Korenchevsky (1961) “old
age is an abnormal, pathological syndrome, inwhich physiological
processes of ageing are complicated and aggravated by various so-
called degenerative diseases of old age.” His views were captured
in an influential posthumous work Pathological and physiological
ageing.
Korenchevsky’s view of aging is important not least because
he was the founder of both the British Society for Research on
Ageing and the International Association of Gerontology (IAG).
Thus it is perhaps unsurprisingly that at the first meeting of
this organization (Liege, Belgium 1950) the Honorary President
identified the two major challenges before the participants as
(1) the definition of aging and (2) the distinction between the
effects of aging and disease. To require that such a distinction be
drawn presupposes that the individual asserting this need already
considers aging and disease to be separate entities. Although in
1957 the President of the Fourth Congress, Professor Greppi,
dissented from this view and argued that aging should be viewed
as a progressive disease terminating in death, a conceptual
distinction between aging and disease was a general feature of
thinking among IAG participants (Shock and Baker, 1988).
A particularly influential and articulate proponent of the aging-
disease distinction was Nathan Shock (1906–1989). Shock was an
early member of the Anglo-American “Club for aging” founded
by Vladimir Korenchevsky (in 1949 he served as the secretary
of the “American Branch” of the Club which would eventually
become the Gerontological Society of America) and a significant
figure within the IAG. Crucially, Shock was also one of the
founders of the Baltimore Longitudinal Study on Aging (BLSA).
The conceptual framework underlying this study was made clear
by Shock et al. (1984) inNormal HumanAging in phrases of which
Galen might have been proud.
“Although the incidence of disease increases with age,
ageing and disease are not synonymous. Aging is a
normal concomitant of the passage of time that takes
place in everyone; disease occurs in only a part of
the population: : :Although there are wide individual
differences in the rate at which age changes take place
ageing affects all members of a population, whilst specific
diseases and accidents are selective” (Shock et al., 1984)
Hopefully, it is clear from the preceding summary that the
accusation by De Grey and Rae (2007) that early gerontologists
deliberately invented the distinction between ageing and disease
because “by ring fencing their area of work intellectually,
gerontologists hoped to ring-fence it financially” is unfounded
and unfair. These early researchers were not making some cynical
bid for a separate pot of grant money. Instead, they were echoing
a medical tradition about the relationship between ageing and
disease which predated not just the scientific method, but the
English language.
It would also be mistaken to assume that researchers operating
within a paradigm that distinguished between aging and disease
considered “natural changes” to be benign. Their view has been
eloquently summarized by Rowe et al. (1990).
“Even if one finds a change with age in carefully
screened “normal” subjects, it is important to
understand that normality does not necessarily mean
harmlessness: : :although systolic blood pressure increases
“normally” with age that does notmean it is harmless: : :Just
because one defines some age-related changes as normative,
one must not overlook their potential adverse effects”
Perhaps unfortunately for all concerned, this conceptual
distinction between “natural” (and normal) aging and “unnatural”
disease is ripe with the potential for fundamental philosophical
error and “moral concern.” At the inception of the field this was of
limited importance because the potential for clinical intervention
in later life problems was very limited. However, this has changed.
Modern Insights and Solutions from the Biology
of Aging
In retrospect, the publication of Normal Human Aging occurred
at a gerontological watershed. The mid 1980s could be said to be a
period in which something was known about why aging occurred
muchwas known aboutwhat changed as humans aged, but almost
nothing about how this happened.
With the publication of Comfort’s (1956) Biology of senescence
it was recognized that aging is very common among species in the
biosphere and thus provide a selective advantage to organisms
which show it. A compelling explanation for the evolution
of aging is based on the observation that the force of natural
selection declines with age due to population attrition. As a
result, even though the reproductive ability of “old” and “new”
non-aging organisms are identical, under normal circumstances
“old” organisms contribute fewer offspring to the next generation
than the “new” organisms simply because there are fewer of
them (Williams, 1957). Thus, any mutation that favors early life
fecundity will be selected for even if it results in deleterious effects
later on in the lifetime (a type of gene action termed antagonistic
pleiotropy). Crucially, as well as explaining why aging happens,
antagonistic pleiotropy also allows for the evolution of non-aging
organisms provided they either lack a germ-line soma distinction
(exemplified by the cnidarian hydra) or if the efficiency with
which the organism produces offspring per unit energy increases
over time.
Since aging evolved as the result of nothing more that the
unprogrammed result of selection for early reproductive success,
there is no requirement that the processes controlling the duration
of life should be either (i) few in number of (ii) common between
organisms. However, in the mid-1980s it became clear that this
situation is in fact the case. Mutants in the insulin/insulin-like
growth factor signaling pathway (IIS mutants) have been shown
to have significantly extended lifespans (Piper et al., 2008; Selman
et al., 2008). These pathways converge on the TOR protein
and treatment of mice with the semi-selective mTOR inhibitor
rapamycin extends lifespan by 20%, and slows many functional
changes associated with aging. Rapamycin is a compound in
routine clinical use and provides a potent proof of principle that
drugs targeting fundamental healthspan maintenance pathways
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could be used clinically. Indeed, a related compound everolimus
(RAD001) is nowbeing used in trials to improve immune function
in the elderly. It is well tolerated and shows significant beneficial
initial effects (Mannick et al., 2014).
In parallel with this work it is now clear that the finite
capacity to replace lost cells plays a causal role in mammalian
aging. Senescence is the permanent entry of individual cells
into a viable, but non-dividing state, usually as the result of
repeated cell division. The molecular pathways which trigger
this process are complex but are now relatively well understood.
Cell senescence can be observed in vitro in cells from a wide
variety of different species and acts as an anti-cancer mechanism.
Considered in these terms, senescence appears to be an example
of antagonistic pleiotropy at the process level. In the early part
of the organismal lifespan entry into the senescent state probably
prevents the growth of tumors, thus contributing to organismal
survival. However, cellular senescence is typically associated with
the heavily upregulated secretion of proinflammatory factors and
other changes which have the potential to produce degenerative
effects (Coppé et al., 2008; Burton et al., 2009; Kipling et al.,
2009). As a result of declining clearance rates with age senescent
cells accumulate in multiple tissues with in vivo age in a variety
of species (Kipling et al., 2004; Herbig et al., 2006). The best
evidence that senescent cells play a causal role in aging is the recent
observation that their ablation in a transgenic mode (Baker et al.,
2011) improves multiple aspects of aging (including metabolic
dysfunction and wheel running). Most recently it has been shown
that interdiction of key nodes of the pro-survival gene expression
networks upregulated in senescence (either pharmacologically or
using siRNA) killed senescent cells, but not their proliferating
or quiescent, counterparts. In vivo this resulted in extended
healthspan. Since the production costs of these first generation
“senolytics” are low (a generic form of dasatinib could be
produced for as little as $4 for a daily dose) such treatments are
likely to be cost-effective (Zhu et al., 2015).
Crucially, the same mechanisms cause both age-related
diseases, and features of aging considered in the past to be
“natural changes” (e.g., the accumulation of senescent cells in
the skin contributes to wrinkling, a “natural change” and to
cardiovascular disease, an “age-related disease”). If the distinction
between aging and age-related disease is false then the practical
consequences of maintaining that such a distinction exists could
be severe.
The Implications of a Conceptual Divide between
Aging and Disease
The existence of a conceptual divide between aging and disease is
practically problematic for two reasons.
A. Naturalistic Fallacy or the “Nofruit arguments” Galen’s
argument that aging and disease are distinct is easy to grasp,
coherent and compelling. But it is important to recognize that it is
essentially just an exercise in logic resting upon the definition of
“disease” as abnormal function. Thinking about aging and disease
like this raises surprising conceptual barriers to intervention. To
illustrate this, imagine a land (let us call it “Nofruit”) where
everyone has scurvy. Following Galen’s logic, in Nofruit scurvy
is considered by the population to be a “natural condition.” This
categorization immediately raises a potential barrier to action that
is illustrated by Achenbaum (1995) below:
“Like other historians of aging, I indicate that most present
day researchers on aging do not consider “old age” to be a
disease. No “magic bullet” retards senescence.”
One interpretation of Achenbaum’s thinking is:
“Diseases have “magic bullets” or cures. Most authorities
think ageing is not a disease so it cannot, by definition, have
a cure.”
Thinking like this is, in itself, a disincentive to research. In
Nofruit the line of thinking would go.
Diseases have “magic bullets” or cures. Most authorities think
scurvy is not a disease so it cannot, by definition, have a cure.
Thus, most Nofruit scientists wouldn’t even try to find a cure
for scurvy even though orange juice represents about as cheap and
effective a “magic bullet” as can be imagined. The “problem” of
scurvy would be tacitly ignored, much the way the possibility of
successful intervention in aging is tacitly ignored in the real world.
However, let us assume that in Nofruit a researcher or clinician
has not been discouraged by Achenbaum’s argument and has
discovered that scurvy is curable. Any such researcher wishing
to provide a rationale for the treatment of scurvy will essentially
recapitulate the argument of Rowe et al. (1990), normality does
not mean harmlessness.
So far so good, but the conceptual problem with “treating” the
“normal” is that any decision to do so may potentially fall foul
of the “naturalistic fallacy.” This is the (erroneous) philosophical
position that equates the normal (or natural) with the “good”
and the “unnatural” with its converse. On this fallacious logic
avalanches, volcanoes and tsunamis are “good” (because they
are natural) whilst books, houses and clothing are bad (because
they are not found in nature). When applied to aging (or to
scurvy in Nofruit) the naturalistic fallacy leads some actors to
conclude that aging (or scurvy) shouldn’t be “interfered with”
(note use of the term, rather than “treated”). It is important to
note that treating a “disease” does not trouble an actor in the grip
of the naturalistic fallacy because diseases are conceptualized as
“abnormal” or “unnatural” by definition and can accordingly be
treated, because they are bad.
Not all treatments will necessarily trigger this response (in the
real world, for example, male impotence is a common age-related
change yet there is no serious effort to banViagra) but the potential
for any particular intervention to do so is always present and
acts as a further disincentive to treatment. The naturalistic fallacy
and related arguments are one root cause of debates around “the
medicalization of old-age” (Bury, 2005). In Nofruit a proportion
of the population would worry about “the medicalization of
scurvy.”
B. False division of unity. It is important to recognize that the
Nofruit arguments do not require aging and age-related disease
to share causal mechanisms. Both may cause harm in different
ways. However, in actuality the mechanisms which cause aging
and age-related disease really do overlap very substantially. Thus
distinguishing between “aging” and “age-related disease” probably
represents an artificial distinction; human understanding has
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drawn an arbitrary line on the complex phenotype which is
later life.
Maintaining an artificial aging-disease distinction give rise
to a contradiction. What is the ethical rationale for treating
entities classified as “diseases” caused by senescent cells (like
cardiovascular disease) but not treating entities classified as
“natural changes” (like wrinkles) which are also caused by
senescent cells? As yet this problem does not seem to have
been fully recognized by bioethicists, probably because the
science on which it is based is so new that it has not yet been
disseminated. The little which has been said on the topic however,
offers gerontologists little reassurance that our work will be well
received.
From Indifference to Moral Concern
Blackburn (2001) has pointed out “for human brings there is no
living without standards of living.” Ethical frameworks determine
the things we find acceptable, or admirable or contemptible. Put
simply, they tell us, as actors, what is right and what is wrong.
Thus, branding a course of action as immoral will, all things being
equal, act as a significant disincentive to action. Good people do
not willingly do bad things.
The prospect of successful intervention into the causal
mechanisms of aging has produced moral concern most notably
from the bioethicist Leon Kass who wrote in L’Chaim and Its
Limits: Why Not Immortality? (Kass, 2001).
“Should we: : :welcome efforts to increase not just the
average but also the maximum human life span, by
conquering aging, decay, and ultimately mortality itself?”
Kass, takes the view that
“Confronted with the growing moral challenges posed by
biomedical technology, let us resist the siren song of the
conquest of aging and death.”
Appleyard (2007) in How to live forever or die trying is even
more explicit in his opposition to biogerontology. He is careful
first to define what he calls “medical immortality”:
“We shall not be immortal in the sense that we cannot die,
plainly we can still be killed. But we could not be killed by
disease or age our bodies would be immune to infection,
dysfunction or the ravages of time. We would be medically
immortal.”
After about 300 pages spent detailing his travels into the wilder
fringes of biogerontology and life-extension Appleyard concludes:
“There is a deep and absolutely unavoidable selfishness
involved in the idea of immortality. Billions have lived and
died, why should I in particular be immortal? Why should
I persist in being?”
Selfishness is bad (even if Appleyard’s version sounds
more like survivor guilt). Therefore for Appleyard, since
immortality requires deep selfishness, immortality is deeply bad.
By implication any research which facilitates such a goal is bad.
Biogerontology facilitates such a goal. Therefore biogerontology
is bad.
Biogerontologists are probably well advised to take arguments
of the type advanced by Kass and Appleyard seriously. This is
because they may resonate with ideas which a proportion of the
population in some countries share to some extent (Ipsos-MORI,
2006; Pew Research, 2013). Such views discourage policy makers
from targeting aging mechanisms to treat the health problems
seen in later life and at worst they suggest that gerontology itself
is morally wrong. What response can gerontologists reasonably
offer? I would suggest the following:
From what we currently know about the biology of aging
the most that could be conceived as scientifically deliverable,
even centuries from now, is to be “non-aging” (as defined in
Terminology in a Contested Field). But non-aging organisms
are not in a state remotely comparable to Appleyard’s “medical
immortality” they have very long, but finite, lifespans and die from
“inside” like aging organisms, just at much lower rates.
This point is crucial because both Appleyard and Kass (in
different ways) treat immortality as a state humans could achieve.
Medical immortality is then held up to ethical scrutiny and found
wanting. But since “immortality” is a state that humans can never
achieve all the authors are offering is, at bottom, a moral critique
of never-never land. Immortality may be bad but biogerontology
cannot be bad by association since it cannot help anyone become
immortal. Neither can anything else.
One problem within speculative writing in this area is the
sloppy tendency to equate “extended lifespans,” “1000 year
lifespans” and “immortality.” Given that the Earth is about 4.5
billion years old, a human lifespan stretched to a millennium
(or even ten millennia) represents little more than the blink of
an eye and is not realistically on offer, any more than “medical
immortality.”
However, it is noteworthy that a long, but finite, life is a different
moral proposition from “immortality” unless one takes the view
that humans have a “natural” lifespan, adherence to which is
a moral good. But this line of thinking it is very close to the
naturalistic fallacy with the added sting that (given what we now
know about the shared mechanisms between “aging” and “age-
related disease”) it renders treating age-related disease unethical
(or perhaps treating any disease at all unethical since smallpox and
syphilis are “natural” components of the biosphere).
In fairness to Appleyard and Kass they seem to have arrived
at the conclusion that “1000 year lifespans” and “immortality”
are possible in part because of utterances from figures on the
scientific fringe. Of these fringe figures Aubrey DeGrey is the best
known andmost articulate and his writingsmay thus stand for the
whole. In Ending Aging De Grey summaries current progress in
gerontology and writes:
“I expect many people alive today to live to one thousand
years of age and to avoid age-related health problems even
at that age.” Even more bullishly he sketches a vision of
largely unimpeded progress (which he terms “longevity
escape velocity”) and continues:
“There is a strong chance that you-the reader of this book-
will live to experience the rejuvenation of your body leading
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ultimately to an endless summer of literally perpetual
youth.”
De Grey is committing something of a logical fallacy. The
existence of impressive scientific breakthroughs today does not
pre-ordain impressive scientific breakthroughs tomorrow. If
scientists start to talk like science fiction writers, where will the
public go for scientists? Vain hopes beget vain fears.
Lastly, although there is doubtless some overlap between
popular views about the validity of aging research and the
thoughts of Appleyard and Kass it is less clear how much of their
thinking is shared among the public. When discussing extended
healthspan Kass comments:
“Some, of course, eschew any desire for longer life. They
seek not adding years to life, but life to years: : : This has
much to recommend it. Who would not want to avoid
senility, crippling arthritis, the need for hearing aids and
dentures, and the degrading dependencies of old age? But,
in the absence of these degenerations: : :We could no longer
comfort the widow by pointing out that her husband was
delivered from his suffering.”
However, research into public attitudes to gerontological
research in the UK indicated a desire among the participants for
a long and active life rather than to serve as object lessons in
deliverance from suffering. de Magalhães (2014) has suggested
that the concerns shown about extended lifespans by some
participants in the Pew Research survey may result from their
belief that these would be associated with the kind of morbidity
seen in aging Americans today. If so this reinforces the key
message that healthspan is the outcome most desired by our
populations. The most effective way to facilitate this would be to
significantly increase the funding available for research into the
fundamental biology of aging and facilitate the rapid translation
of its discoveries into the clinical arena.
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